I can’t figure out where “if a malevolent, all-powerful god existed, he would create an uncountably infinite number of suffering beings, which is infinitely many times as many beings as a benevolent god would make” comes from. It seems to me that the analyses of theism and maltheism are symmetrical.
Well, you see, St Anselm taught us that God is the greatest possible being, and a being who exists only in our imagination wouldn't be as great as a being who exists in reality, and therefore God exists in reality.
Similarly, a malevolent deity who only creates as many miserable universes as Job's god wouldn't be as malevolent as a deity who creates uncountably infinitely times that many, so that's how many miserable universes he would make.
(Non-facetiously: yes, it's symmetric. My point is that Bulldog's arguments for a benevolent god prove too much, and work equally well if you replace benevolent with malevolent.)
Um, OK. But I don't see how Anselm's (idiotic) proof applies to a maximally malevolent deity. I will concede that you have convinced me that if a maximally malevolent deity exists, then he is as bad as you say.
I should have known better than to ask my original question. Anselm had too much time on his hands. Perhaps Bentham's Bulldog does too.
Isn't this still only an argument for a god's existence rather than specifically for the malevolent god? Both the benevolent and malevolent gods create an uncountably infinite number of beings. So they're both infinitely more likely than the non-many-worlds theodicy, but equal in likelihood to each other.
Nope! You see, for an evil god to truly be maximally evil, he can't create fewer or the same number of miserable universes as a benevolent god. He has to create infinitely times as many!
I'm not sure how this would affect your weighing of probabilities (whether it would cause you to weigh theism or atheism as being more likely than maltheism), but a thought that may count against maltheism, if a maltheist deity is all-knowing, is that he/she/it would experience every existing experience firsthand (this is part of "knowing everything"), and thus would experience exactly whatever suffering its infinity of suffering creations does, exactly as they do. (This view could be labeled "omnisubjectivity", a term I got from Linda Zagzebski.) If they are in unbearable agony, it is, as well. It is possible that a maltheistic deity would be masochistic and get some secondary enjoyment out of unbearable suffering, but it would find that suffering unbearable firsthand.
Is it possible to be in unbearable suffering and not will it to end? (Maybe not for some definitions of "unbearable".) Is it possible to really know what unbearable suffering is going to be and choose it? (Again, maybe not for some definitions of "unbearable".)
Maybe this is evidence for atheism? The existence of unbearable suffering means that those who are suffering are alone with their suffering.
A possible theistic interpretation would be that God values the existence of his creations more highly than the suffering they cause him. Which is a more potent motivator, masochism / sadomasochism (the maltheist's motivator) or love? I guess you could argue either way with that, but I would guess that among conscious beings, love motivates more beings to endure unbearable suffering than masochism does, for what that's worth. So maybe, if we are choosing between maltheism and "a loving God exists", we might be unsure which it is, possibly favoring the "loving God" hypothesis.
Given the ideas in my second paragraph above, maybe an "omnisubjective" God would have to be forced into situations of unbearable suffering by the will of another (generally evil) being, taking away from his absolute omnipotence. (This is my view, more or less.)
I can’t figure out where “if a malevolent, all-powerful god existed, he would create an uncountably infinite number of suffering beings, which is infinitely many times as many beings as a benevolent god would make” comes from. It seems to me that the analyses of theism and maltheism are symmetrical.
Well, you see, St Anselm taught us that God is the greatest possible being, and a being who exists only in our imagination wouldn't be as great as a being who exists in reality, and therefore God exists in reality.
Similarly, a malevolent deity who only creates as many miserable universes as Job's god wouldn't be as malevolent as a deity who creates uncountably infinitely times that many, so that's how many miserable universes he would make.
(Non-facetiously: yes, it's symmetric. My point is that Bulldog's arguments for a benevolent god prove too much, and work equally well if you replace benevolent with malevolent.)
Um, OK. But I don't see how Anselm's (idiotic) proof applies to a maximally malevolent deity. I will concede that you have convinced me that if a maximally malevolent deity exists, then he is as bad as you say.
I should have known better than to ask my original question. Anselm had too much time on his hands. Perhaps Bentham's Bulldog does too.
Isn't this still only an argument for a god's existence rather than specifically for the malevolent god? Both the benevolent and malevolent gods create an uncountably infinite number of beings. So they're both infinitely more likely than the non-many-worlds theodicy, but equal in likelihood to each other.
Nope! You see, for an evil god to truly be maximally evil, he can't create fewer or the same number of miserable universes as a benevolent god. He has to create infinitely times as many!
I'm not sure how this would affect your weighing of probabilities (whether it would cause you to weigh theism or atheism as being more likely than maltheism), but a thought that may count against maltheism, if a maltheist deity is all-knowing, is that he/she/it would experience every existing experience firsthand (this is part of "knowing everything"), and thus would experience exactly whatever suffering its infinity of suffering creations does, exactly as they do. (This view could be labeled "omnisubjectivity", a term I got from Linda Zagzebski.) If they are in unbearable agony, it is, as well. It is possible that a maltheistic deity would be masochistic and get some secondary enjoyment out of unbearable suffering, but it would find that suffering unbearable firsthand.
Is it possible to be in unbearable suffering and not will it to end? (Maybe not for some definitions of "unbearable".) Is it possible to really know what unbearable suffering is going to be and choose it? (Again, maybe not for some definitions of "unbearable".)
Maybe this is evidence for atheism? The existence of unbearable suffering means that those who are suffering are alone with their suffering.
A possible theistic interpretation would be that God values the existence of his creations more highly than the suffering they cause him. Which is a more potent motivator, masochism / sadomasochism (the maltheist's motivator) or love? I guess you could argue either way with that, but I would guess that among conscious beings, love motivates more beings to endure unbearable suffering than masochism does, for what that's worth. So maybe, if we are choosing between maltheism and "a loving God exists", we might be unsure which it is, possibly favoring the "loving God" hypothesis.
Given the ideas in my second paragraph above, maybe an "omnisubjective" God would have to be forced into situations of unbearable suffering by the will of another (generally evil) being, taking away from his absolute omnipotence. (This is my view, more or less.)